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NEW YORK PRACTICE COVERAGE
the city of power to waive the defense of statute of limitations by
any act, and the finality placed by the legislature on all time
provisions relevant to suits against municipalities. Although this
decision is authority for the exercise of equitable estoppel against a
municipality's defense of the statute of limitations, reliance upon
this case should be coupled with a degree of caution since a slight
variation in the facts might demand the application of the rules
as espoused by the dissent.
ARTICLE 3 - JURISDICTIoN AND SEavIcE, APPEARANCE AND
CHOICE OF COURT
CPLR 302(a)(2).: Applicable where defendant is New York
doniciliary when cause of action arises, but is non-domiciliary
at time the action is commenced.
In Massik v. Zimmerman,22 the supreme court, Erie County,
held that a "gap" exists in CPLR 302, which permits a person
who was a domiciliary at the time the cause of action accrued to
escape the court's jurisdiction by changing his domicile prior to
the commencement of the action. Although recognizing that the
result was inconsistent with the legislature's intent to expand
jurisdictional bases, the court reasoned that the "gap" could be
closed only by amendment of the statute.
This view was shared by the supreme court, Broome County,
in State v. Associated Bldg. Contractors of the Triple Cities, Inc.23
The court there held that under CPLR 302 it was necessary that a
person be a non-domiciliary both at the time the cause of action
accrued, and when the summons and complaint were served. How-
ever, upon appeal, the appellate division, third department,2 unan-
imously reversed, holding that the legislature could not have intended
such a "gap."
This decision is consistent with O'Connor v. Wells, 5 wherein
the supreme court, Greene County, rejected the "gap" argument,
and, pursuant to CPLR 104, liberally construed CPLR 302. The
result achieved in Associated and O'Connor seems to be in accordance
with the intention of the legislature. It appears inconsistent that
the courts by virtue of CPLR 302 (a) would acquire jurisdiction
over a non-domiciliary who commits an act within the state, and
22 48 Misc. 2d 217, 264 N.Y.S2d 647 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1965).
2347 Misc. 2d 699, 263 N.Y.S.2d 74 (Sup. Ct Broome County), revd sub
non., State v. Davies, 24 App. Div. ?d 240, 265 N.Y.S.2d 358 (3d Dep't
1965). See The Biannual Survey of New York Practice, 40 ST. JoHN'S .
REV. 310 (1966).
24 State v. Davies, supra note 23.
25 43 Misc. 2d 1075, 252 N.Y.S.2d 861 (Sup. Ct. Greene County 1964).
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yet would not have jurisdicffon over a domiciliary who commits
the same act, solely because of a change of domicile prior to
commencement of the action.
CPLR 308.: Immunity from service of process extended to arbitra-
tion proceedings.
A nonresident, voluntarily present in this state solely for the
purpose of appearing as a party or witness in a judicial proceeding,
is immune from service of civil process during the proceeding and
for a reasonable time before and after.2  This immunity is afforded
to encourage voluntary appearance of nonresidents and to secure
the expedient administration of justice.2 7  Every proceeding of a
judicial nature which relates to the trial of the issues of a case or
to a public matter comes within the rule.2
In Treadway Inns Corp. v. Chase,29 defendant, a nonresident,
was served with process while voluntarily attending an arbitration
proceeding as a witness. The supreme court held that immunity
from service extended to parties or witnesses voluntarily appearing
in arbitration proceedings. Arbitration proceedings are, in essence,
a form of judicial proceeding in that the arbitrator has the power
to subpoena and administer oaths.30 Thus, to extend immunity
from service of civil process to parties and witnesses in these
proceedings is desirable.
CPLR 308(3).: Validity of service unaffected by defendant's
failure to find affixed process.
In Denning v. Lettenty,31 a malpractice case, the court referred
to a referee the question of whether there had been proper service.
The plaintiff claimed that valid service was effected pursuant to
CPLR 308(3) ,2 and, in support thereof, introduced the affidavit
26 1 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MU.LER, NEW YoRx CiviL PRAcTicE 308.05
(1965).
27 Where attendance in the state is involuntary there is no immunity. 1
WmNSTEIN, KoRN & MILLER, NEW YoRz CiL PRACTiCE 308.06 (1965).
28 Matter of Ferrari, 134 Misc. 728, 236 N.Y. Supp. 406 (Surr. Ct Kijigs
County 1920); 1 WEINSTEIN, KoRm & MIu.TE, NEW YoR CIviM PRAcriCE
308.05 (1965).
2947 Misc. 2d 937, 263 N.Y.S.2d 551 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1965).
30 Treadway Inns Corp. v. Chase, 47 Misc. 2d 937, 940, 263 N.Y.S2d
551, 553 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1965).
3148 Misc. 2d 185, 264 N.Y.S.2d 619 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1965).
32 "Personal service upon a natural person shall be made: (3) where
service under paragraph one cannot be made with due diligence, by mailing
the summons to the person to be served at his last known residence and ...
affixing the summons to the door of his place of business, dwelling house or
usual place of abode within the state. . .
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